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fited is the attorney, who is guaranteed a minimum payment from
the award, leaving the client liable for the difference. 247 In order to
remedy this apparently unintended anomaly, it is suggested that
the regulations be amended to permit recovery against the carrier
2 48
on a scale that more closely reflects typical retainer agreements.
Richard L. O'Toole

JUDICIARY LAW

Jud. Law § 479: State constitutionally may prohibit attorneys
from soliciting by mail
In order to increase public awareness of the availability and
cost of legal assistance, the Supreme Court has held that a state
may not prevent an attorney from advertising the nature and fees
of his services. 24 9 Although the Court acknowledged the need for
tion-the award of fees may not exceed the recovery of first-party benefits, with interest.
[1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.16(c)(7). Similar hourly limitations apply to awards made by
master arbitrators. [1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.17(k). It should be noted that the $2850 award
affirmed by the FreshMeadows Court, calculated at $150 per hour, on an underlying claim
of $70, 49 N.Y.2d at 96, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362, would be impermissible
under the current regulations.
217 Notwithstanding the monetary restrictions contained in the regulations, the claimant remains contractually liable to his attorney for fees in excess of those awarded. It should
be noted that the regulations initially promulgated included a provision prohibiting the attorney from charging his client an amount in excess of the fees permitted by the regulations.
[1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.16 (c)(7)(ix). This provision was ordered rescinded in Rachlin v.
Lewis, 96 Misc. 2d 701, 705, 409 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). The court
held that the regulations were inconsistent with § 675(1), since the statute only authorized
limitations on fees recovered from the carrier.Id. at 706, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 597. In addition,
the court concluded that it would be impermissible to interfere with any private contactual
arrangements a lawyer has made with his client. Id. (citing N.Y. Jud. Law § 474 (McKinney
1968)).
28 An increase in the permissible award of fees would enhance a claimant's ability to
retain competent counsel, since the successful attorney would be assured of adequate remuneration. It is submitted that a more realistic restriction might authorize an increased
award, calculated at an hourly rate for small claims and a contingency for larger claims,
since this would simulate typical private fee arrangements. See generally 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES ch. 1 (1973). A regulation of this nature would alleviate the difficulties of
computing the award by permitting the arbitrator or the court to award fees similar to those
the claimant would have paid his attorney, absent the statutory provision allowing recovery
from the carrier.
219 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374-77, 384 (1977). The Bates holding was limited
to the narrow question whether it was constitutionally permissible for a state to bar an
attorney from truthfully advertising the availability and cost of his services in a newspaper.
In finding that a state could not bar such conduct, the Bates Court reaffirmed its decision in
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reasonable state regulation of the manner, time and place of legal
advertising,2 50 the scope of permissible attorney conduct in the
area of advertising has remained unclear. Recently, in In re Koffier,2 51 the Appellate Division, Second Department, attempted to
clarify one aspect of this sensitive issue,2 52 holding that under section 479 of the Judiciary Law25a and the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) ,254 an attorney may not solicit business by
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) that a total ban on professional advertising constitutes an abridgment of the first
amendment right to freedom of speech. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). Prior to
the Virginia State Bd. decision, commercial advertising had been considered outside the
penumbra of first amendment guarantees. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266 (1964); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
2'0 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977). Notwithstanding the Court's recognition of society's "strong interest in the free flow of commercial information," it nevertheless has found that commercial speech is distinguishable from other types of speech. Consequently, it has been "afforded. . . a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values [and is subject to] modes of
regulation which might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). See generally Erickson, The
Consumers Right to Know: An Analysis of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. and the Effect of the First Amendment Right to Receive
Information on Lawyers' Advertising, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. Rav. 991, 1005-11 (1977). For
example, a state validly may prohibit false or deceptive advertising. Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 383 (1977). Additionally, because of the public's ignorance in the area of legal
services, the Bates Court suggested that advertising dealing with quality often may have a
tendency to mislead, and therefore, also might be restricted. Id. at 383-84. See ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 9.1(b) (1980); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101(B) (1980).
70 App. Div. 2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (2d Dep't 1979).
The longstanding prohibition on solicitation and advertising by attorneys had been
based upon a desire not only to maintain the dignity of the profession, but also to avoid
misrepresentation, political corruption and the stimulation of unnecessary litigation. Note,
Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81
YALE L. J. 1181, 1184 (1972). At the same time, however, it had been argued that since
solicitation may serve to reduce fees and assist the public in obtaining legal services, it is
not without benefit. Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 674, 681-84 (1958). It should be noted that studies conducted subsequent to the Bates decision have refuted the Bar's concern that advertising would result in
a reduction in the quality of legal services. McChesney and Muris, The Effect of Advertising
on the Quality of Legal Services, 65 A.B.A.J. 1503, 1505 (1979).
'13 Section 479 of the Judiciary Law provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or his agent, employee or any person acting on
his behalf, to solicit or procure through solicitation either directly or indirectly
legal business, or to solicit or procure through solicitation a retainer, written or
oral, or any agreement authorizing an attorney to perform or render legal services,
or to make it a business so to solicit or procure such business, retainers or
agreements.
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 479 (McKinney 1968).
'-,
Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
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mail.2 s1
In Koffler, the defendants sent letters to approximately 7,500
homeowners stating that they understood that the owner was selling his home 256 and that they were willing to represent him in the
transaction at a specified price.25 7 A similar letter was sent to real
estate brokers and offered reduced fees to broker-referred clients. 25 8 The Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee subsequently instituted proceedings against the defendants alleging that
they had directly solicited clients in violation of the Code and sec[a] lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson
who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, DR 2-103(A)(as amended Oct. 1978); see id.
EC 2-3.
"1 70 App. Div. 2d at 254, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
256 Id. at 257, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 564. How the defendants had obtained the information
that the homeowner was going to sell his home was not established at the hearing.
257 Id. at 254, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. One of the defendants previously had placed an
advertisement announcing his legal fees for real estate closings in Newsday, a daily newspaper with a large suburban circulation. The letters offered to reduce the advertised price of
$235 to $195. Id. at 255, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. The letter stated:
We understand that you are selling your home and we would like to take this
opportunity to inform you that because we are now allowed to advertise our services YOU no longer need to pay $400 to $600 for legal representation when you
close title.
IN FACT, BECAUSE WE ARE ABLE TO CONTACT YOU BY DIRECT
MAIL, WE ARE WILLING TO TRANSACT AND REPRESENT YOU AT THE
SALE OF YOUR PROPERTY FOR $195.
Feel free to contact us if you have any questions. If you wish, you may
make an appointment with us prior to selling your house. This will enable us to draw your contracts quickly when you and a purchaser come
to terms.
Enclosed you will find our business card. We look forward to representing you.
Id. at 254-55, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
258 Id. at 255, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. The letters mailed to the real estate agents stated in
pertinent part:
We think you will agree that the fee of $235 is very competitive, NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE NOW HAPPY TO ADVISE THAT OUR FEE TO ALL
BROKER-REFERRED CLIENTS WILL BE $195, REGARDLESS OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY.
Enclosed are two of our business cards. Our principal office is at [ooo] Main
Street, Islip, New York, however, we also have facilities at [oo] Randall Road,
Shoreham. We can be contacted in Islip at [555-1000] during normal business
hours or in Shoreham at [555-2000] after 9 P.M. and on weekends.
We look forward to assisting you by assisting your clients.
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tion 479 of the Judiciary Law.2 9 The defendants answered contending that the statute and rule as applied to solicitation by mail
were unconstitutional. 260 A referee found that the attorneys had
violated the Code and the Judiciary Law "not because they communicated with prospective clients by mail, but because the content of that communication . . . constituted solicitation rather
26 1
than advertising.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed the referee's finding, holding that the letters were a form of
solicitation that constitutionally could be prohibited.2 62 Justice
Shapiro, writing for a unanimous court,2 63 rejected the defendants'
contention that their mailings were a form of permissible advertising.2 64 The court reasoned that the letters to the homeowners did
not merely alert the public to the availability of the defendants'
services.26 5 Rather, directed to a small group of individuals, they
constituted solicitation of business from a "captive audience . . .
believed to be interested in a particular transaction. ' 26 6 Moreover,
Justice Shapiro observed that the letters were isolated from the
"marketplace of competitive advertising" and therefore were not
the type of public notice contemplated by the Supreme Court
259 70 App. Div. 2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. See notes 253 & 254 supra.
210

70 App. Div. 2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. The defendants also interposed an

affirmative defense of good faith reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which sanctioned attorney advertising. See note 249 supra.
262 70 App. Div. 2d at 257, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. See note 272 infra. The court had
referred the proceedings to the Hon. John F. Scileppi, a retired judge of the Court of Appeals. 70 App. Div. 2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
262 70 App. Div. 2d at 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
211 Presiding Justice Mollen and Justices Hopkins, Rabin and Gulotta concurred in
Justice Shapiro's opinion.
264 70 App. Div. 2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. Though admitting that advertising "is a
method, in a broad sense" of solicitation, id. at 271, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573, Justice Shapiro
explained that each is separate and distinct from the other. To "advertise" was considered
to be "It]he act or practice of bringing . . .one's business, into public notice .. " To
"solicit" was defined as "[t]o importune, entreat, implore, ask, attempt, try to obtain." Id. at
271-72, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573 (quoting State v. Cusick, 248 Iowa 1168, 1172, 84 N.W.2d 554,
556 (1957)). See Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 n.25 (1978). But see
note 283 and accompanying text infra.
265 70 App. Div. 2d at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573. See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 384 (1977).
266 70 App. Div. 2d at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The defendants' statement in the letter
that they understood that the recipient was selling his home apparently was the determinative factor in the court's decision that the letters constituted solicitation rather than advertising. Id. See note 272 infra.
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when it upheld the attorney's right to advertise his services. 267 The
second department also characterized the letter to the real estate
brokers as impermissible solicitation since it was designed to establish a referral service.2 68 Consequently, the court concluded that by
soliciting through the mail, the defendants had engaged in unethical conduct proscribed by the Judiciary Law and the Code. 269 Emphasizing the "important governmental interest" in regulating its
licensed professionals,2 70 the Koffler court also found that the statutory ban on solicitation by mail was constitutional.2 7 1
While the Koffler court's prohibition of the defendants' mall
261770 App. Div. 2d at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
268

Id. at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The court noted that the solicitation of the real

estate brokers implicated possible conflicts of interest. Id. at 274 n.5, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575
n.5.
269 Id. at 272-75, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573-75. Noting that the defendants' good faith reliance on the Supreme Court's sanction of advertising in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977), see note 260 supra, should preclude disciplinary action, the court nevertheless put
the Bar on notice that future misconduct would not be dealt with leniently. 70 App. Div. 2d
at 275, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575. Solicitation in the past has been punished with disbarment. See
In re Millstein, 25 App. Div. 2d 129, 133, 267 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (1st Dep't 1966); In re
Levine, 254 App. Div. 165, 166, 4 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231 (1st Dep't 1938); In re Rosenthal, 250
App. Div. 421, 427, 294 N.Y.S. 165, 171 (2d Dep't 1937).
270 70 App. Div. 2d at 272-75, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573-75. According to the Koffler court,
the considerations relevant to the regulation of attorney solicitation are: "(1) whether there
are ample alternative channels for communication of the information ...
(2) whether the
solicitation involves vexatious conduct or invasion of privacy ... and (3) whether the solicitation unduly. . . erodes true professionalism contrary to the 'State's interest in maintaining high standards among licensed professionals'. .. ." Id. at 273-74, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 57475 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that mail solicitation is as much an invasion of
the privacy of the recipient as is in-person solicitation. Id. at 273 n.4, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 574
n.4, see Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 426 (1978). Moreover, the court opined that the legalization of solicitation would result
in a loss of respect for the legal profession. 70 App. Div. 2d at 274 n.4, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 574
n.4. Since an attorney may publicize his services through less intrusive and more restrained
advertising, the court concluded that the state's compelling interest in regulating the legal
profession and protecting the public from vexatious conduct justified precluding the solicitation of clients by mail for pecuniary gain. Id. at 271, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
2171In its analysis, the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Ohralick
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Ohralick involved in-person solicitation by an
attorney. See note 275 infra. In holding that a state legitimately may prohibit such conduct,
the Court stated that "[t]he entitlement of in-person solicitation of clients to the protection
of the first amendment differs from that of the kind of advertising approved in Bates, as
does the strength of the State's countervailing interest in prohibition." 436 U.S. at 455.
Thus, a state may utilize prophylactic measures to prevent solicitation involving "fraud,
undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct,' " id. at
462, such as the invasion of privacy, conflict of interest and commercialization of the legal
profession. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-36 (1978).
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campaign appears justifiable, 2 it is submitted that the reasoning
employed to reach that result is both ambiguous and problematic.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,27 3 the Supreme Court sanctioned
"truthful [newspaper advertising] concerning the availability and
terms of routine legal services. ' 274 Subsequently, the Court held
that a state may proscribe solicitation by attorneys that is in fact
"misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of deception or
improper influence" and may prohibit in-person solicitation for re27 5
muneration "under circumstances likely to result in these evils.
As to the broad range of activity that lies between objective newspaper advertisements and in-person solicitation, the Court has furnished little guidance. The Koffler court opted for a test that requires a categorization of the challenged activity as either
The Koffler letters differed from the advertisement in Bates in that instead of
merely advising the public of the availability and fees of legal services, the letters were
targeted towards prospective clients who apparently were interested in the transaction and
"urge[d] that such persons retain the [defendants] to represent them." 70 App. Div. 2d at
272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573; see notes 249 & 250 supra. Such language of entreaty directed to
individuals interested in selling their homes may result in overreaching, which the states are
authorized to proscribe. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978). Since the large volume
of mail sent by the defendants apparently made it improbable that they actually knew that
the recipients were interested in selling their homes, see 70 App. Div. 2d at 274 n.5, 420
N.Y.S.2d at 575 n.5, it would seem that the defendants' letters might constitute the type of
fraudulent or deceptive advertising that may be restrained. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 383 (1977). But see ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 9.3(b)(2).
22 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See notes 249 & 250 supra.
272

274 433 U.S. at 384.
2176In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978). In Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 457 (1978), the defendant was suspended from the Bar for personally soliciting a
contingency arrangement with two accident victims. The defendant claimed that his in-

person solicitation was "indistinguishable .

.

. from the advertisement in Bates" and was

protected by the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 454. Rejecting
this contention, the Court stated that "in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often
demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim... [is] to encourage speedy and ... uninformed decisionmaking; there is no
opportunity for intervention or counter-education . . . ." Id. at 457.
In In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), an attorney for the American Civil Liberties

Union (ACLU) allegedly advised a citizen of her legal rights without being requested to do
so and later sent a letter informing her that free legal assistance was available. Noting that
the attorney had not sought representation for pecuniary gain, the Court held that for the
ACLU, litigation was a form of political expression entitled to full constitutional protection.
Id. at 428; see note 250 supra. The Court also observed that sending a letter, in contrast
with in-person solicitation, "involved no appreciable invasion of privacy, nor did it afford
any significant opportunity for overreaching or coercion." Id. at 435. In concluding that the
attorney could not be disciplined for this form of solicitation, the Primus Court emphasized
that only one letter had been sent and that it contained information relevant to the litigation that the attorney previously had discussed with the recipient. Id. at 435 n.284.
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"solicitation" or "advertising. '276 In view of the difficulties that inevitably will arise in both invoking and attempting to comply with
such a test, it is suggested that the better approach would have
been to determine whether the communication would more likely
than not result in the "substantive evils" that a state legitimately
may seek to avoid or would debase the standards of the legal
profession.2
Notwithstanding the perplexities of the Koffler decision, it appears that not all mailings are prohibited. 2 8 The second department's attack on the Koffler letters apparently was not motivated
by a disapprobation of an attorney's use of the mails to publicize
his services, but rather by the court's criticism of the contents of
the communications and to whom they were directed.2 7 Thus, it
would seem that in the future, an objective notice in the form of a
letter, pamphlet or circular mailed to the general public might pass
muster.8 0 It is submitted that such activity would accord with the
278

See 70 App. Div. 2d at 271-75, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 572-75; Bonomi, ProfessionalRe-

sponsibility, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
277 See notes 270-71 supra. It is submitted that such an approach would make it easier
for the reasonable attorney to determine what forms of advertising or solicitation he may
properly utilize. A similar rationale was employed in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568
S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978), where two lawyers were charged with having solicited clients in violation of DR 2-103(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The charge was based on a
letter mailed to two real estate agencies on firm stationary which contained a statement of
the service they rendered, their fees, and the estimated time in which routine services could
be performed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the letters did not constitute impermissible solicitation, id. at 934, since "the letters contained no words generally associated
with solicitation" and did not present any "of the evils . . . which exist in the case of 'inperson solicitation.' "Id. Moreover, the court found that the letters would not "encourage a
person to make a speedy and possibly uninformed decision," id., nor would they increase the
likelihood of overreaching or deception to any greater extent than would other forms of
permissible advertising. See id. Finally, the court concluded that the Bar Association could
ensure that letter advertisements complied with ethical standards by "requir[ing] the attorney to mail a copy.., to the [Bar] Association simultaneously with the mailing.., to...
the public." Id.
The significant distinction in the Koffler and Stuart letters must be noted. In contrast
to the Stuart letters, it is suggested that the letters in Koffier involved a substantial potential for fraud or deception. See note 272 supra.
278 70 App. Div. 2d at 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The court stated that it did not "reach
the question of whether all mailing is proscribed." Id.
271 See id. at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573; Bonomi, supra note 276 at 28, col. 3.
280 As noted by Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in Bates:
The Court speaks specifically only of newspaper advertising, but it is clear that
today's decision cannot be confined on a principled basis to price advertisements
in newspapers. No distinction can be drawn between newspapers and a rather
broad spectrum of other means-for example, magazines, signs in buses and subways, posters, handbills, and mail circulations.
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spirit of the Bates Court's effort to encourage the free flow of information concerning the availability of legal services.28 1
Koffler suggests that an advertising attorney must avoid any
semblance of solicitation.2 82 Since advertising itself is a form of solicitation,28 3 it is submitted that the second department's attempt
to distinguish the terms offers little clarification of the permissible
bounds of legal advertising. It is hoped, therefore, that the bar associations and judiciary will promulgate criteria delineating the
proper contents and modes of advertising in order to assist the
2 4
profession in conforming its conduct to acceptable limits.
Joseph Trovato
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 402 n.12 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added);
see note 277 supra.
281 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); see note 249 supra.
282 As noted by one commentator, an attorney wishing to use letters to advertise must
combine careful wording with a large distribution to the public at large to avoid the stigma
of solicitation. See Bonomi, supra note 276 at 1, col. 1.
283 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

50 (5th ed. 1979). "Advertise" is defined as "[a]ny oral,

written, or graphic statement made by the seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business. .. ." (emphasis added). See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 474 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); 70 App. Div. 2d at 271, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573. But
see State v. Cusick, 248 Iowa 1168, 1172, 84 N.W.2d 554, 556 (1957); note 264 supra.
284 The Court in Bates called upon the Bar to play a "special role. . . in assuring that
advertising by attorneys flows both freely and cleanly," Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977).
Although the rules of the first and second departments attempt to prescribe the acceptable form and content of attorney advertising, it is submitted that they fail to establish
sufficiently concrete guidelines. These provisions, which became effective in March, 1978,
provide that the purpose of attorney advertising is to increase "public . . . awareness of
legal needs and to provide information relevant to the selection of the most appropriate
counsel." [1980] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 603.22(d), 691.22(d). For examples of acceptable advertisements, articles and brochures, see LAWYER ADvERTISING KIT, ABA SEC. OF. ECON. OF LAW
PRAC. (1978).
The A.B.A. Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards recently issued its
Model Rules of Professional Conduct for evaluation by the Bar. The proposed rules, which
eventually would replace the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, specify the extent to
which advertising by the legal profession is permissible. Like DR 2-101(A) of the code, proposed rule 9.1 prohibits an attorney from making false, fraudulent, or misleading statements
to a client. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 9.1 (1980); see ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImILTY, DR 2-101(A) (1980). As to advertising, proposed rule 9.2
states:
(a) A lawyer may advertise services through public communications media such
as a professional announcement, telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or
other periodical, radio, television, or general direct mailing ...
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 9.2 (1980); see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101(B) (1980). Biographical information including the attorney's legal
education and background, the range of fees for services, and any "other information that
might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance," may be included in the adver-
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW

Carrier'srelease from future liability effected by employee's third
party recovery held not a benefit for consideration in apportioning litigation expenses
Section 29(1) of the Worker's Compensation Law (WCL) provides that an employee injured in the course of his employment
through the fault of one other than his employer or fellow employee may pursue a third party action for damages without compromising his statutory entitlement to compensation. 2 15 In order to
ensure the continued viability of the compensation system, however, the compensation carrier is afforded a lien upon the proceeds
of any recovery to the extent of the benefits previously paid to the
employee. 8 8 Where the carrier seeks to satisfy such lien out of the
proceeds of a judgment or settlement procured through the efforts
tisement. See id. It is submitted that the vagueness of these rules detract from their value
as purported standards to be followed by the advertising attorney.
It should be noted that proposed rule 9.3 permits solicitation on a limited basis. It
provides, in part, that "a lawyer may initiate contact with a prospective client ...
[b]y a
letter concerning a specific event or transaction if the letter is followed up only upon positive response by the addressee. . . ." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 9.3
(1980). This provision apparently would sanction the type of letter sent by the defendants
in Koffier.
I'l N.Y. WORK. Cohip. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Originally, an employee had to choose between bringing his action against the third party or receiving payments from the compensation carrier. Ch. 816, § 29, [1913] N.Y. Laws 2293. The employee's
election to receive compensation benefits constituted an automatic assignment of the tort
cause of action of the carrier. Id.; Curtin v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 340, 39 N.E.2d
903, 904 (1942). The practical consequence of this election was that injured employees,
financially unable to await the uncertain outcome of litigation, would "choose" to receive
the compensation payments. See Gegan, The Compensation Carrier'sRight to Restitution
for Medical Expenses Through a Lien on the Employee's Tort Recovery, 52 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 395, 401 (1978); 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 282, 282 (1938). The abolition of this forced election allowed the employee to collect his benefits without surrendering his right to bring a
third party suit. Ch. 684, § 29, [1937] N.Y. Laws 1556 (McKinney). See also Gegan, supra,
at 401.
286 See N.Y. WORK. Corap. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). The compensation carrier's lien was an outgrowth of the 1937 amendment to section 29(1) of the WCL
designed to prevent a double recovery by the employee and to provide the carrier with an
opportunity to recoup payments already made to the employee. See Granger v. Urda, 44
N.Y.2d 91, 97, 375 N.E.2d 380, 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1978); Becker v. Huss Co., 43
N.Y.2d 527, 538, 373 N.E.2d 1205, 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982-83 (1978); Curtin v. City of
New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 342-43, 39 N.E.2d 903, 905 (1942); Gegan, supra note 284, at 40102. The lien attaches to any recovery, whether by judgment or settlement, arising from the
injury which originally generated the compensation payments. See Ryan v. General Elec.
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 6, 9, 256 N.E.2d 188, 189, 307 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1970); Petterson v. Daystrom Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 32, 39, 215 N.E.2d 329, 332, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1966).

